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Economic setbacks that could
overwhelm many cities are not new
to border communities. In 1982, the
peso devalued 121 percent against
the dollar in real terms.1 The current
devaluation—55 percent from
November 1994 through February
1995—probably won’t be as severe
as the 1982 crisis. As NAFTA’s new
trade rules take effect and con-
sumers’ disposable incomes fluctuate
with the peso’s value, industries
along the border will adjust to meet
new demands.
The Texas–Mexico border
stretches along the Rio Grande for
1,248 miles—from El Paso to the
lower Rio Grande Valley. Border
counties are home to more than 1.5
million people, or about 9.2 per-
cent of Texas’ population, and
about 6.4 percent of the state’s total
employment. The border has a
relatively large share, 11.5 percent,
of Texas’ jobs in nondurable manu-
facturing, in part because of El Paso’s
concentration of apparel and textile
factories. Another important border
industry is wholesale and retail
trade, which contributes 27 percent
of all border jobs, compared with
24 percent statewide.
Heavy immigration to border
cities keeps unemployment rates
higher than the state’s 1994 average
of 6.4 percent. Last year, the unem-
ployment rate averaged 9 percent in
Laredo, 9.9 percent in El Paso, 11.5
percent in Brownsville–Harlingen–
San Benito and 16.5 percent in
McAllen–Edinburg–Mission. Even
so, the border’s employment growth
has surpassed the state’s average in
nine of the past 10 years. Despite
their brisk growth, border counties’
incomes are among the lowest in the
nation; their 1992 per capita income
averaged $10,933, about 59 percent
of the state average of $18,437.
NAFTA’s New Rules of the Game
While being a major benefactor of
freer trade, the border also benefits
from barriers to trade. For many
years, cities along the border have
thrived selling goods and services
to Mexican visitors and helping the
influx of importers and exporters
comply with international rules
and regulations. In 1994, NAFTA
changed the demand for these ser-
vices, and some businesses profited
while others suffered.
By lowering trade restrictions,
NAFTA made it easier for U.S. com-
panies to set up shop in Mexico,
which reduced the demand for
some border retail services, particu-
larly to Mexican wholesalers who
export U.S. goods to resell at home.
With more U.S. outlets in Mexico,
fewer Mexicans need to cross the
border to purchase U.S. goods.
L
aredo’s long lines of cars and
trucks backed up at bridges to
Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, were re-
placed in January by long lines of
displaced workers at the unemploy-
ment office. For Laredo and other
border communities, 1994 was a
year of sweeping change, first as
the North American Free Trade
Agreement, or NAFTA, took effect
and then as the peso’s value plum-
meted. And 1995 promises even
more change. Dozens of border
retailers, heavily dependent on Mexi-
can shoppers, have closed their
doors. Export firms, truckers and
customs brokers whose businesses
were bustling throughout 1994 now
wait for the peso to stabilize.
Despite current economic stress,
long-run prospects for the Mexican
economy are bright. The border
remains an important distribution
center to northern Mexico and will
continue to grow, but the changes
of 1994 will influence the region’s
economy well into the future.2
Changing regulations under NAFTA
lowered the cost of exporting U.S.
goods and reduced the demand for
services that help traders accommo-
date previous regulations.
At the same time, NAFTA’s new
rules and restrictions boosted cross-
border trade traffic and demand for
other services. Rising trade volume
—accompanied by new tariff rates,
rules of origin and labeling require-
ments—helped border customs
brokers, import and export firms,
and warehouses.
The Peso Is Devalued
After a year of sharply rising
trade, Mexico’s December peso
devaluation once again altered the
demand for border industries’ pro-
ducts and services. The number of
loaded trucks crossing the Laredo
Bridge System southbound into
Mexico increased 15 percent in 1994
and then plummeted to pre-NAFTA
levels following the devaluation.
January claims for unemployment
insurance doubled (Chart 1). Retail
sales dropped over the holiday
shopping season, typically stores’
busiest period of the year. Retailers
quickly cut back on inventories and
employees and many stores eventu-
ally closed. Sagging demand also led




The peso’s changing value means
U.S. border residents must be mind-
ful of daily peso–dollar exchange
rate movements. For nearly a decade,
Mexican policy provided a rela-
tively predictable exchange rate for
currency transactions. During the
mid-1980s, Mexico targeted the peso’s
value relative to the dollar. Mexico
began allowing the peso’s value to
float within a widening band in
1991. After the December devalua-
tion, however, Mexico abandoned
the band and allowed the exchange
rate to float freely. Now, the peso is
far less likely to show large reduc-
tions in value, but frequent small
movements are more likely.
The effects of Mexico’s new ex-
change rate policy are becoming
evident. Since the devaluation,
currency exchange houses report an
increase in business. For now, U.S.
stores that once accepted pesos or
dollars are accepting only dollars
to avoid the risk of day-to-day
exchange rate shifts, or are accept-
ing pesos at deep discounts from
market value. Day-to-day uncertainty
has increased for Mexican shoppers
and businesses purchasing supplies
in the United States because ex-
change rates must be a consideration
in every purchase.
The peso devaluation was not
entirely negative for border com-
munities. The devaluation lowered
the cost of labor and other inputs
for maquiladoras because most
operate on dollar-denominated
budgets with costs in pesos.2 The
peso’s drop has sparked renewed
interest in the Mexican border as a
low-cost off-shore manufacturing
site. The benefits maquiladoras
derive from the peso’s devaluation
boost economic activity, especially
among U.S. legal, accounting, ware-
housing and transportation firms.
The border also benefits from
maquiladoras’ expanding demand
for goods and services from U.S.
suppliers. Although most of these
suppliers are located outside the
border region, more of them are
either opening operations on the
border or relocating there to lower
transportation costs and help main-
tain “just-in-time” inventories.3
A Bright Long-Run Outlook
Uncertainty over the Mexican
economy and the peso will bring
continued change to border com-
munities in the near term. Analysts
who initially thought the situation
would improve in six to eight months
have extended their estimates to a
year or longer. Still, with economic
fundamentals strong in Mexico,
long-run prospects for the border
remain bright. Major construction
and infrastructure expansion plans
continue unabated, including those
for a new hospital, hotels and free-
ways. Large retailers are continuing
with expansion plans based on the
positive long-term prospects for
the region. In February, Foley’s
announced plans to add stores in
Brownsville, McAllen and Laredo,
and in March, JCPenney and Mervyn’s
opened new stores in Laredo. Ulti-
mately, the devaluation and its
aftermath may amount to nothing
more than a speed bump along the
region’s highway to prosperity.
—Fiona Sigalla
Notes
1 The real value of the dollar against the
peso, according to the Dallas Fed’s
Trade-Weighted Value of the Dollar
Index, went from 71.5 to 157.7 from
January 1982 to September 1982.
2 Maquiladoras assemble goods in Mexico,
importing inputs duty-free as long as a
percentage of the final product is ex-
ported from Mexico. NAFTA phases in
new rules for Mexican sales by maquila-
doras during 1994–2000, greatly libera-
lizing maquiladoras’ access to domestic
markets. In 1994, the allowance of
domestic sales as a share of the previous
year’s export production was raised to
55 percent. This allowance will increase
annually from 1994 to 2000 in 5-percent
increments. See Lucinda Vargas, “The
Changing Dynamics of the Maquiladora
Industry, Part 2” Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas, El Paso Branch Business
Frontier, November/December 1994.
3 See Lucinda Vargas, “Border Economic
Integration: The Case of the Maquila-
dora Industry” (Speech presented at the
Fourth International Conference on the
Quality of Life on the Border) Univer-
sity of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, Texas,
March 17, 1994.
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Laredo Unemployment Claims Up,
Border Traffic Down
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We begin by looking at GDP—
the broadest and most long-standing
of the aggregate output and income
statistics.1 Much of the hand-wringing
has been over GDP’s apparently
lackluster performance over the
past two decades, particularly as
compared with the 1950s and 1960s.
Chart 1 shows per capita real GDP
(red line), which is the inflation-
adjusted measure of the economy’s
output per person, over the period
1869–1994. Per capita real GDP
growth averaged 2.1 percent annu-
ally over the 1954–73 period, then
slowed to 1.6 percent through 1989.2
The latter growth rate is a half-point
less, which represents a significant
slowdown. However, the rate of
growth during the 1954–73 period
was quite high by historical standards.
As Chart 1 shows, over the 84 years
from 1869 through 1953, per capita
real GDP growth averaged 1.6
percent annually—a rate virtually
identical to that of the 1974–89
period, not that of 1954–73.3
More recently, GDP has been
recovering from the 1990–91 reces-
sion. After stalling during 1989 and
1990, and subsequently turning
down, per capita real GDP hit a
trough in the fourth quarter of 1991.4
Since then, per capita real GDP has
grown at an average annual rate of
2.5 percent (nearly 3 percent in
1994), well above the 1.6-percent
growth needed to eventually restore
GDP to its long-term trend.
In this light, America’s recent
economic progress appears much
less subpar. Indeed, the country’s
period of abnormal growth is argu-
ably the 1950s and ’60s, an era
during which the United States rose
to the position of dominant indus-
trial leader of the world, while con-
sumers sought to catch up from the
paucity of the Great Depression
and World War II.5
We look next at consumption.
Presumably, consumption, and not
production, is the end goal of eco-
nomic activity, and it is households’
consumption experience from
which their impressions of living
standards are formed. The data show
(Chart 1) that consumer spending
rose even faster (2.4 percent) than
GDP during the 1950s and 1960s,
as the vast military expenditures of
World War II (and later the Korean
War) were steadily pruned from the
government’s budget. With labor
and industry freed from the yoke of
heavy government control, factories
turned to producing cars rather
than tanks and the like, and the
share of output going to private con-
A
pril marks the beginning of the
fifth consecutive year of U.S.
economic expansion. Gross domes-
tic product (GDP) growth has aver-
aged 3.1 percent since the recession’s
trough, job growth in 1994 was the
highest in a decade, unemploy-
ment is hovering around historic
lows, and the consumer price index
through 1994 registered its best
four-year performance since the
early 1960s.
Despite this good news, many
recent media reports have painted a
bleak picture of the average Ameri-
can worker’s prospects. These
reports cite studies that claim wages
and incomes are falling, that eco-
nomic progress is not keeping pace
with past rates and that everyone is
not sharing equally in the economy’s
gains. In light of these conflicting
views on the economy, it is under-
standable that many people are
asking, What’s the truth?
A thorough assessment of Ameri-
cans’ living standards must include
a host of considerations that matter
to people, such as leisure time,
working conditions, life expectancy,
pollution, crime and other aspects
of life (see Cox and Alm 1994).
Clearly, more than purely pecuniary
considerations—wages, earnings,
income—matter to people. How-
ever, the bulk of the recent studies
have focused solely on monetary
measures of Americans’ well-being.
This article, therefore, focuses
narrowly on money issues in an
attempt to sort through some of the
conflicting information.
Chart 1
Per Capita Real GDP and Consumption, 1869–1994
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NOTE: The broken lines represent above-trend growth rates during the 1954–73 period.4
sumer goods rose from 56 percent
in 1953 to more than 63 percent by
1973. And that’s not all. Research
has found that households regard
about 23 percent of government
nondefense spending as consump-
tion; thus, consumers’ effective total
share of production rose from 58
percent in 1953 to nearly 68 percent
by 1973.6
In effect, the paring down of
military expenditures from 13.2 per-
cent of GDP in 1953 to 5.7 percent
by 1973 boosted consumption
growth by nearly 0.4 percent annu-
ally over those two decades. Clearly,
this boost could be transitory, at
best, but it nonetheless helped feed
the consumer euphoria of the era.
No such boost was enjoyed subse-
quently, even with the dissolution
of the Soviet Union. The end of the
Cold War has resulted in a paring
down of military expenditures to
4.7 percent of GDP, but that repre-
sents a relatively small gain for
consumers.7 Thus, again, the statistics
highlight the uniqueness of the
1954–73 experience.
With these historical perspectives
on GDP and consumption, America’s
more recent economic performance
may look less subpar. Still, skeptics
cite other statistics that paint a
bleak picture of the nation’s recent
economic progress. Chart 2 shows
four measures of Americans’ mone-
tary well-being frequently cited by
economic reports. These are per
capita personal income, median
family income, median household
income and average hourly wages.8
As the chart shows, one can preach
four distinctly different sermons on
Americans’ recent economic pro-
gress, depending on the statistic
wielded. For example, per capita
real personal income increased by an
average of 1.4 percent a year from
1974 through 1993. During that same
period, on an annual basis, median
family income increased only a
tenth of a percentage point, median
household income fell about a tenth
of a percentage point, and average
wages fell by one-half a percentage
point. This represents a sharp con-
trast for four economic series that a
lay audience would generally ex-
pect to be interchangeable.
Income, Wages and Total Compen-
sation: Resolving the Conflict
There are many quirks in econo-
mic statistics that can cause hidden
biases when aggregate data are
used to gauge economic progress.
Changes in the population’s size,
work habits, social habits or age
distribution; changes in the way we
get paid; or changes in the goods
that we produce can all cause the
interpretation of the economic vari-
ables we measure today to differ
from yesterday. The size of the
average U.S. family has declined
markedly over the past 20 years,
more people participate in the labor
force, the average workweek is
shorter, the labor force is younger,
employee benefits are higher, and
so on. Such changes distort year-to-
year comparisons of virtually every
aggregate statistic, making compari-
sons difficult and inviting many
different conclusions from the data.
Thus, it is important to sort through
this economic puzzle to determine
what’s really happening to Ameri-
cans’ monetary well-being.
For the purpose of comparing
today with yesterday, two of the
most severely tainted economic
aggregates are median household
income and median family income.
Today’s households are nearly 15
percent smaller than yesterday’s
(average household size was 3.01
persons in 1973 versus 2.63 today),
and, therefore, household income
is spread over fewer people.9 The
upshot is that the household income
statistics significantly understate the
true income gains for comparable
households today versus yesterday.
Similarly, the median family income
statistics for yesterday’s Brady
Bunch cannot be compared with
those of today’s Murphy Brown
with any measure of accuracy.
Also severely tainted are the
simple wage data, their biggest bias
being that they ignore employee
benefits.10 Employee benefits have
Chart 2
Four Measures of Americans’
Well-Being, 1973–93
(Inflation-adjusted)
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SOURCE OF PRIMARY DATA: U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Employee Benefits Report (various years) and Employee
Benefits Historical Data, 1951–1979.5
grown from just 20 percent of pay-
roll in 1953 to more than 41 percent
today. As Chart 3 shows, the pro-
portion of payroll devoted to health
benefits rose from 3 percent in 1953
to more than 14 percent recently.
Retirement and savings benefits
went from 5 percent of payroll in
1953 to 13 percent in 1993. Pay-
ments for time not worked, which
includes vacations and holidays,
sick leave, military leave and family
leave, went from 7.5 to 11 percent
of payroll over the same period.
Benefits are a form of employee
compensation. Like wages, workers
value benefits and even bargain for
them. Indeed, since benefits are often
untaxed (or are taxed at a substan-
tially lower rate than wage income),
employees may be willing to give
up more than a dollar in wage in-
come to receive a dollar’s worth of
benefits. This means, in terms of
the data, that the rise in employee
benefits may have resulted in a
more-than-equal decline in wages,
again distorting the armchair analyst’s
ability to gauge well-being by look-
ing simply at the wage data.
Once employee benefits are
added to the raw wage data, the
story becomes a bit more optimistic
(Chart 4). As mentioned earlier,
from 1974 to 1993, real wages fell
about a half percentage point a
year. However, real total compen-
sation, which includes wages and
benefits, rose about a half percentage
point a year. Add to this the fact
that today’s labor force is roughly
two years younger than that two
decades ago, and the wage gain
figures look even less subpar.11
A better gauge of economic well-
being is per capita real personal
income. Roughly speaking, per capita
real personal income is the (inflation-
adjusted) sum of all income-related
receipts and disbursements—wages,
rents, interest, profits and govern-
ment transfers, less taxes—per
person in society. It lacks the prob-
lems of household and family in-
come because the economic unit is
of a fixed size (one person), and it
lacks the problems of the wage data
because it measures more than
simply wage income.
Personal income is essentially just
the payment side of GDP (the main
substantive difference being allow-
ances for depreciation), and it behaves
accordingly. Per capita real personal
income grew at a 1.65-percent rate
over the 1974–89 period, virtually
identical to the 1.64-percent growth
in per capita real GDP.12
Per capita real personal income,
though, is not devoid of hidden
distortions, such as those stemming
from changes in the labor force
participation rate or annual hours
worked. Over the past two decades
the average workweek has declined
by 2.4 hours, and American workers
have added seven days of vacations
and holidays annually, yielding
roughly a 180-hour reduction in
average time worked per year.13 In
essence, Americans have taken a
portion of their progress in the
form of leisure rather than income,
lowering the income and GDP
growth numbers from what they
otherwise could have been.
The Return to Education:
Widening the Income Distribution
One major issue remains: the
sharply slower growth in employee
compensation (wages plus benefits)
as compared with income. From
1974 to 1993, total compensation
grew at a 0.7-percent rate, as com-
pared with 1.4 percent for per capita
personal income (Chart 4). In
essence, the gap widened between
income and compensation. It should
be noted that data on wages and
compensation pertain to only pro-
duction and nonsupervisory workers,
or about 63 percent of the work
force, whereas the income data
cover all workers. The widening gap
tells us that the share of income
paid for production and nonsuper-
visory work is declining, while the
share paid elsewhere—to profes-
sionals, supervisors, managers and
owners—is growing.
One explanation appears to be
the rising return to human capital.
In an increasingly information- and
service-oriented economy, business
capital has come to encompass not
just physical plant and machinery
but, more and more, intellectual
capital as well.14 As Chart 5 shows,
the workers reaping most of the
economic gains have been those at
the higher end of the education
spectrum. The income premium to
education is substantial and has
grown markedly over the past two
decades. In 1992, college graduates
made an average of 82 percent
more than high school graduates,
up from only 43 percent in 1972.
The really big returns to education
these days come with advanced
degrees—Ph.D.’s, M.D.’s, J.D.’s,
CPAs and so on. In 1972, people
with advanced degrees earned 72
percent more income than high
school graduates. By 1992, they
made 2.5 times more. Today, high
Chart 4
Per Capita Personal Income, Total
Compensation and Hourly Wages, 1953–93
(Inflation-adjusted)
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school dropouts earn scarcely half
as much as high school grads, and
the gap is widening.
Summary
In the public arena, reports can
produce shock waves long before
the facts are determined. Recent
economic reports have been no
exception. Economic doomsday
stories have proliferated from grossly
superficial analyses based on highly
aggregated wage and income statis-
tics. A more careful examination of
the data that takes into account just
a few of the surrounding factors—
the increase in employee benefits,
the decline in median household or
family size, the shortening in the
average workweek and so on—
shows a generally much less bleak
view of Americans’ progress in living
standards.15 Indeed, from the per-
spective of the two broadest and
most long-term economic aggre-
gates—per capita real GDP and
consumption—Americans’ recent
gains are generally right on par with
those garnered historically. The
case for alarm thus has little merit.
Aggregate statistics, of course,
reflect averages. Some people have
gained more, others less. But one
thing can be said conclusively: the
income of the well-educated has
grown substantially faster than that
of the less-educated over the past
two decades. Clearly, education is
one of the most effective ways
Americans can increase their income
potential.
— W. Michael Cox
Beverly J. Fox
Notes
1 In 1991, the Department of Commerce
switched from gross national product
(GNP) to GDP as its generally preferred
measure of aggregate economic activity.
Chart 1 uses GNP data since GDP data
are not available before 1947. Because
the difference between the GNP and
GDP series is negligible (less than one-
tenth of 1 percent on average), the
distinction is unimportant here and is
henceforth ignored.
2 The average growth rates of per capita
real GDP during the periods 1869–1953,
1954–73 and 1974–89 were estimated
by regressing the log of per capita real
GDP on a constant and time for each
of the three separate periods. The same
is true for consumption, beginning in
1889. Available GDP data begin in 1869,
and consumption and government pur-
chases data begin in 1889. The years
1953, 1973 and 1989 were chosen since
they represent business-cycle peaks.
3 More precisely, per capita real GDP
growth averaged 1.61 percent, 2.08
percent and 1.64 percent, respectively,
over the three successive periods. Thus,
growth during the 1974–89 period was
actually slightly higher than that during
1869–1953.
4 Per capita real GDP hit a trough in the
fourth quarter of 1991, later than the
official GDP trough, as the recovery’s
initial GDP gains fell short of simple
population growth.
5 See Wynne (1992a and 1992b).
6 The government purchases many differ-
ent types of items, from tanks to school
lunches. Clearly, some goods provided
publicly—food stamps, rent subsidies,
school lunches, Medicare and so on—
are of a consumer nature and may be
viewed by households as equivalent to
those they could buy privately. Follow-
ing the research of Kormendi (1983)
and Aschauer (1985), we assume that
approximately 23 percent of govern-
ment nondefense purchases are viewed
by households as equivalent to private
consumption.
7 Growth in total real consumption aver-
aged 1.6 percent annually during the
1889–1953 period and 1.9 percent
during the 1974–89 period but jumped
to over 2.4 percent during 1954–73.
8 Each of the series cited henceforth—
per capita personal income, median
household income, median family in-
come, average hourly wages and total
compensation—are deflated using the
CPI-UX1 consumer price index.
9 More specifically, the data show that in
1973, the average household had 1.34
adults (members age 18 or older) in the
labor force, 0.67 adults not participating
in the labor force and one child. For
1993, these numbers are 1.34, 0.60 and
0.69, respectively.
10 Another problem with the wage data is
that they do not measure take-home
pay, as affected by tax rates and transfer
payments. Adjustment for these factors
is beyond the scope of this article.
11 As the age of the work force declines,
so does the level of experience and,
hence, income and wages, yet the
aggregate measures unavoidably con-
ceal this change. We make no attempt
to adjust for the age factor here.
12 See note 3.
13 See Cox and Alm (1994) for more details.
14 See Cox and Alm (1995) for a broad
examination of the growth of the
service sector and what it portends.
15 Two other major income data adjustments
needed are for taxes (and transfers) and
improvements in product quality. The
Department of Labor recently began an
extensive study to determine the extent
(if any) to which price indexes are over-
stated due to an under-recognition of
the gains in product quality. Overstate-
ment of inflation would be tantamount
to understatement of the gains in vir-
tually every series on Americans’ mone-
tary well-being—real GDP, consumption,
wages, compensation and income.
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Beyond the Border
ties became insolvent as the price of
those assets fell. The fear of a general-
ized bank run, preemptive withdrawals,
capital outflows and reallocation of
funds among financial institutions that
followed forced Argentina to request
the assistance of the IMF and to adopt
fiscal austerity measures that in the
absence of the tequila effect wouldn’t
have been needed to sustain its con-
vertibility law of a 1:1 peso–dollar
exchange rate.
The tequila spillover didn’t stop in
Argentina. Brazil, also in the midst of
overhauling its financial system, is one
of Argentina’s strongest trading partners.
Fear of a crisis in one country quickly
transfers to the other. Unlike Argentina,
Brazil could not support the speculative
attack against its currency and was
forced to devalue. Chile’s economy is
also highly integrated with Argentina’s.
Over the past four years, more than
two-thirds of all Chilean investment
abroad has gone to Argentina. These
economic and financial links may ex-
plain why Chile’s stock market began
to weaken in March 1995 as well.
However valid these ex post wisdom
explanations, Tables 1 and 2 suggest
important objective differences between
the Mexican economy and those of
other Latin American countries. Why,
then, have domestic and foreign inves-
tors alike treated them with the same
lack of confidence? Perhaps the answer
lies in their common, pre-1990s past:
a long history of huge budget deficits,
runaway inflation, protectionist policies,
even default on foreign debt payments.
To some investors, Latin American
economies may look like a consumer
who has recently filed for bankruptcy.
A tainted credit history limits a person’s
access to credit, especially in times of
financial turmoil and scarce capital.
Countries, like consumers, need
sound economic policies for quite some
time to clean up their credit records.
During periods of reform, a country
runs the risk that any setback will be
attributed to its reforms, and not to the
unfortunate timing that may catch the
country half-way into a process it failed
to adopt much earlier. Along with tech-
nical expertise and political goodwill,
successful reform may require a bit of
lucky timing. If so, the solution to
temporary setbacks is to keep reforms
intact so opportunity will find these
economies ready the next time it arises.
Chile did exactly that in 1982, despite a
financial crisis and a 14-percent decline
in GDP. The reward: a “Latin American
tiger,” with 1983–94 average annual
GDP growth per capita of 4.6 percent.
—Carlos E. Zarazaga
The Tequila Effect
high concentration of short-term govern-
ment debt (Table 2).
Why, then, are investors reacting in
the same way to countries with different
economic fundamentals? It is difficult
to explain this tequila effect without
taking two factors into account. First,
financial links among the economies
of Latin America were much more
intertwined than most analysts initially
thought, and second, the Mexican ex-
change rate crisis caught many Latin
American economies in the middle of
very deep and radical structural reforms.
One of the countries most adversely
affected, Argentina, was implementing
several new financial policies, including
a new convertibility








only if it receives
one additional
dollar (or its equiva-
lent in other hard
currencies). This
law severely limits
the central bank’s ability to act as a
lender of last resort or to provide deposit
insurance (bailing out financial institu-
tions or depositors by printing money
would violate the convertibility law). The
Achilles’ heel of this law is that, without
a lender of last resort, the fear of a
bank run could trigger one. For that
reason, in early 1994 Argentina intro-
duced regulatory changes in its finan-
cial system, with the ultimate goal of
achieving full compliance of all its
financial institutions with the interna-
tional capital standards outlined in the
Basle Accord. The peso devaluation dis-
rupted this process—to the extent that
a financial institution heavily exposed in
Mexican government bonds and securi-
B
y devaluing its currency on Decem-
ber 20, 1994, Mexico inadvertently
initiated what Latin America has started
to call “the tequila effect” and what
Michel Camdessus, managing director
of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), has dubbed “the first financial
crisis of the 21st century.”
Effects of Mexico’s peso devaluation
rippled through the financial markets of
the so-called emerging economies with
unexpected intensity. It hit the stock
markets of Poland, Turkey, South Korea,
Taiwan and Hong Kong, but especially
those of Latin America. By the end of
February, Argentina’s stock market had
dropped 32.1 percent, Brazil’s 33.6
percent and Peru’s 28.7 percent.
It appears as if on December 21
investors lost the optimism toward Latin
American economies they’d had just the
day before. Mexico’s large current
account deficit and government short-
term debt may have been harbingers of
the Mexican crisis. But what followed
in the rest of Latin America defies expla-
nation in terms of macroeconomic
indicators.
Since 1990, the economies of Argen-
tina, Brazil and Peru have been growing
two or more times faster than Mexico’s
(Table 1). Besides gross domestic pro-
duct (GDP) growth, the current account
balance as a percentage of GDP is
another important gauge of economic
performance because it measures a
country’s ability to repay its foreign
debt. When this rate exceeds the rate of
growth of the economy for a sustained
period, an external debt crisis may be
mounting. Of the economies listed in
Table 1, none but Mexico’s has consis-
tently crossed this threshold. Nor have
the four other economies had Mexico’s
TABLE 2
External Debt of Five Latin American Countries, 1994
Total external Short-term* external
debt as a debt as a
percentage percentage






*One year or less.
TABLE 1
A Look at the Economic Health of Five Latin American Countries
Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Peru
1991—GDP growth1 8.9 1.2 6.1 3.6 2.8
Current account balance2 –1.6 0 0 –5.3 –7.6
1992—GDP growth1 8.7 –.9 10.3 2.8 –2.3
Current account balance2 –3.7 1.6 –1.9 –7.8 –9.2
1993—GDP growth1 6.0 4.1 6.0 .4 6.4
Current account balance2 –2.6 –.1 –5.0 –7.0 –5.2
1994—GDP growth1 6.5 5.3 4.4 3.0 12.0
Current account balance2 –3.5 –.5 –1.1 –7.0 –4.3
1Annual rate.
2As a percentage of GNP.Regional Update
FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE DATA
For more information on employment data,
see “Reassessing Texas Employment Growth”
(Southwest Economy, July/August 1993). For
more information on TIPI, see “The Texas Indus-
trial Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic
Review, November 1989). For more information
on the Texas Leading Index and its components,
see “The Texas Index of Leading Indicators:
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas Fed
Economic Review, July 1990).
On-line economic data and articles are avail-
able on the Dallas Fed’s electronic bulletin board,
FEDFLASH (214-922-5199 or 800-333-1953).
REGIONAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Texas Employment Total Nonfarm Employment
Texas Private
Leading TIPI Construc- Manufac- Govern- Service- New
Index Total Mining tion turing ment Producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
2/95 110.9 118.9 157.3 401.6 1,021.0 1,437.8 4,849.0 7,866.7 1,780.9 681.9
1/95 109.9 118.4 156.9 402.8 1,016.5 1,437.5 4,826.6 7,840.3 1,781.8 681.5
12/94 111.3 118.2 157.7 396.0 1,014.6 1,434.3 4,846.5 7,849.1 1,774.5 675.3
11/94 111.9 118.2 159.6 390.9 1,013.2 1,429.0 4,827.5 7,820.2 1,764.0 674.2
10/94 112.0 118.5 160.6 387.4 1,012.1 1,426.6 4,814.8 7,801.5 1,755.1 669.0
9/94 111.9 118.4 162.9 385.4 1,009.6 1,426.2 4,810.0 7,794.1 1,743.8 664.5
8/94 112.1 118.4 162.4 382.6 1,009.7 1,430.0 4,800.2 7,784.9 1,729.3 658.3
7/94 111.4 118.3 162.5 380.1 1,008.0 1,422.1 4,784.0 7,756.7 1,719.4 660.2
6/94 111.2 118.3 162.8 377.1 1,006.4 1,415.0 4,757.4 7,718.7 1,710.3 655.4
5/94 110.5 118.2 163.3 374.7 1,005.3 1,408.0 4,747.4 7,698.7 1,701.8 651.1
4/94 111.4 118.0 164.0 376.5 1,002.8 1,402.5 4,751.0 7,696.8 1,702.3 649.3
3/94 110.7 117.2 164.2 373.4 999.7 1,396.4 4,712.8 7,646.5 1,709.2 648.4
Total Nonfarm Employment
Net Contributions of Components to Change In Leading Index,￿
December 1994–February 1995
Index, January 1991 = 100
Texas Industrial Production Index
Texas Leading Index and Nonfarm Employment
Index, January 1991 = 100
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1994 was another strong year for the
Eleventh District (Texas, northern Loui-
siana and southern New Mexico). For
the sixth consecutive year, employment
grew faster in all three District states
than in the nation as a whole.1 Louisiana
and New Mexico outpaced national
growth in all major industrial categories.
Texas grew faster than the nation in all
major categories except mining, which
lost jobs. Such broad-based growth
illustrates the Southwest’s appeal to all
types of firms as a low-cost/low-wage
region.
Other factors also contributed to the
region’s relative strength. Proximity to
Mexico made the Southwest a major
beneficiary of NAFTA. The finance,
insurance and real estate (FIRE) sector
grew strongly despite weak employment
growth nationally, and state and local
government employment in District
states grew at twice the national rate.
State-by-State Highlights
Louisiana. Casino gambling appears to
be paying off for Louisiana, at least in the
short run. In 1994, employment directly
linked to river-boat gambling (hotels,
amusements and water transportation)
grew nearly 25 percent, accounting for
one-sixth of the state’s employment
growth. Some of this growth may have
come at the expense of Texas’ tourism
industries, which lost 3,400 jobs in 1994.
New Mexico. New Mexico has the
region’s fastest growing manufacturing
and construction sectors. Manufacturing
employment grew 5.5 percent in 1994,
led by strong growth in the electronic
and electrical equipment industry.
Demand from the manufacturing sector
helped generate double-digit growth in
construction employment and nonresi-
dential construction contract values.
Texas. Texas appears to have profited
from its position as a distribution hub
and its efforts to deregulate intrastate
trucking. Employment in railroad trans-
portation and trucking and warehousing
grew nearly 10 percent in 1994.
—Lori L. Taylor
Note
1 Based on job growth from December to
December each year.